Corruption and its Institutional Foundations: The Experience of South Korea by Kong, Tat Yan
Corruption
and its
Institutional
Foundations:
The Experience of
South Korea
Tat Yan Kong
IDS Bulletin Vol 27 No 2 1996
48
1 Introduction
On his inauguration in 1993 as the first civilian
president of South Korea (hereinafter Korea) in
over thirty years, Kim Young-sam pledge to eradi-
cate corruption (through a so-called 100 days
reform') and to accelerate the liberalization of the
country's dirigiste economy After a highly publi-
cized and seemingly vigorous beginning, public
confidence in the government was first rocked by a
series of disasters resulting in heavy loss of life' and
which resulted in President Kim's governing
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) suffering a serious
reverse in the local government elections of June
1995. Then in the autumn of 1995 came the con-
firmation1 that former president Roh Tae-woo had
amassed a secret political fund amounting to 500
billion won (approximately sus us 650 million)
during his presidency (1988-93). Moreover, vet-
eran opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung, admitted to
having received a modest sus 2.5 million from
Roh during the 1992 presidential election and
attention is turning to the role of President Kim
himself. If the disasters undermined public confi-
dence in the government, then the slush fund scan-
dal has cast doubt on the integrity of all civilian
politicians in Korea, government and opposition
alike. These happenings highlight, first, the con-
tinuing insulation of public officials from democra-
tic accountability; second, the extent to which
bureaucrats tolerated malpractices by the private
sector for the sake of fast growth and financial gain;
and, third, the saturation of the political system by
secret money
The Korean case, therefore, raises interesting
questions about the relationship between corrup-
tion and economic and political change. First, in
view of the firm evidence pointing to the long-
standing prevalence of official corruption in Korean
society, why did this not apparently impede the
country's impressive economic growth? Second, if
corruption did not hinder the macro-indicators of
The collapse of the Songsu Bridge in Seoul (21
October 1994) and an underground gas pipeline
explosion caused by tunnelling in Taegu (28 April 1995)
both did much damage to the government image. The
collapse of the upmarket Sampoong department store in
Seoul on 29 June 1995 occurred just two days after the
local elections.
Korean newspapers had been reporting on speculation
about this secret fund well before the actual disclosure.
performance, what were the hidden costs of this
phenomenon and how were these costs translated
onto the political agenda? Third, if corruption is
associated with the unaccountability of public offi-
cials and the existence of a cosy relationship
between officialdom and its favoured producers,
should we expect democratization and economic
liberalization to remedy the problem or are there
grounds to expect its persistence in spite of reform?
The answers to these issues converge on one point
(and one which constitutes the thrust of the dis-
cussion below), namely that just as the Korean
industrialization path defied neo-classical prescrip-
tions in the 1960s and 1970s, liberal-inspired
beliefs about the effects of democratization and eco-
nomic liberalization are similarly misguided in the
present Korean context. Rather, as the Japanese
case also suggests, the institutional foundations of
corruption (such as a close big business-govern-
ment relationship, single party dominance, and
interventionist bureaucracy) may well survive
Korea's greater congruence with international
trends towards democratization and liberalization.
Corruption takes many forms and definitions.
Here, I define it as the following practices: the
extraction and acceptance of payment from private
entitities (be they individual citizens or businesses)
by public officials; and the private misappropriation
and abuse of public funds.
2 Corruption and Authoritarian
Industrialization, 1961-87
From the inception of military-based rule in 1961
to the democratization of 1987, Korea enjoyed rates
of growth that were unprecedented in economic
history In contrast to the spasmodic growth spurts
enjoyed by other LDCs (such as Brazil during the
late 1960s), Korea's economic performance was sus-
tained, resulting in a thoroughgoing tranformation
World Bank, The East Asian Miracle. Economic
Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
These points are embraced in the various classic works
on Korean and East Asian industrialization. A. Amsden,
Asia's Next Giant. South Korea and Late-
Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989) and R. Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990) discuss the
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of both industrial structure and popular welfare. A
recent World Bank report on the East Asian region
notes the combination of high growth and low
inequality enjoyed by Korea.3
The economic policies and socio-political frame-
work underlying the success of the Korean authori-
tarian industrialization pattern have been widely
commented upon: existence of a developmentalist
bureaucracy modelled on the Japanese one; elimi-
nation of landordism (a barrier to industrial invest-
ment in many LDCs); government provision of
cheap credit to the private sector in exchange for
achieving export targets and other performance cri-
teria (targeted subsidies); the mobilization of cheap
productive labour; and the existence of an authori-
tarian political system that prevented the emergence
of alternative economic strategies.4
From contemporary accounts and recent revela-
tions, it is clear that corruption was a significant
aspect of economic and political life during this
period. The most obvious form of corruption con-
sisted of political donations by business, first to
President Park's DRP (Democratic Republican
Party) and then to the DJP (Democratic Justice
party) founded by his successor, President Chun.
In exchange for favourable consideration (more of
which below) or merely to be able to function
unmolested (this applied especially to foreign com-
panies), business had to contribute to the coffers
of the ruling party5 Not surprisingly, such dona-
tions greatly advantaged the ruling party within
an institutional framework that already confined
legal opposition to very narrow parameters. In ex-
change, business received a plethora of economic
concessions: lax or non-enforcement of legal provi-
sions concerning labour rights (often extending to
violent physical intervention against workers) and
public safety; deliberate oversight of irregularities in
company accounts and holding patterns; subsi-
dization of private investment from public funds
interventionist framework while the labour control
mechanisms are explained in E Deyo, Beneath the
Miracle. Labour Repression in the East Asian
Miracle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
The relative weakness of business under Park is
explained in Dal-joong Chang, Economic Control and
Authoritarianism (Seoul: Sogang University Press,
1985)
('policy loans'); the right to import scarce materials
controlled under a restrictive trade regime; and
government toleration of vast real estate acquisi..
tions. Financial advantage accrued not only to the
ruling party but to officials (and their relatives and
associates) at all levels who were in a position to
dispense favours to business.6
The exchange described above should have been a
recipe for inefficiency, cronyism and mass social
unrest. Yet the government-business relationship
was the institutional foundation of the country's
economic dynamism. How can we reconcile this
apparent contradiction? Extensive government
support (especially subsidized credit) only went to
those businesses which fulfilled the government's
ambitious export targets or which increased pro-
ductive capacity in an officially designated priority
sector.7 Of course such firms kicked money back to
the ruling party and other officials, but the point is
that support from the government was contingent
on demonstrated performance, a contrast with the
government-business relationship that existed in
the 1950s and still pertaining in many LDCs today
There were other factors preventing corruption (at
least in its unproductive or predatory form) from
becoming the dominant aspect of Korean bureau-
cratic behaviour (the opportunity seemed greater
than ever given the concentration of power after the
1961 coup). Apart from the training received under
Japanese colonial rule, the developmentalist orien-
tation of Korean bureaucracy could also be traced to
historical circumstances: social unrest and civil
war, rivalry with communist North Korea and US
pressure for greater economic self-reliance. These
factors impelled the Korean government to build
legitimacy by achieving economic development and
raising living standards.
While the above factors prevented corruption from
stifling growth, there were also factors preventing it
from eroding the social morale upon which long
term development depended. Corruption is most
socially polarizing and destabilizing when it occurs
against a background of general impoverishment
(by highlighting the advantages enjoyed by the
rulers and their clients). By contrast, for Korea,
growth coincided with general improvements in
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living standards, especially from the employment
creation effect of labour-intensive industrialization
in the 1960s. In spite of the existence of authori-
tarian anti-labour governments, the 1970s and
1980s saw sustained real wage increases for many
groups of employees (especially the highly educated
and those working in heavy industry). Moreover,
the government also effected selective redistributive
measures to moderate the social dislocations caused
by its growth policies. For example, the New
Village Movement of the early 1970s helped to
reduce sectoral disparities by extending price sup-
ports to a rural sector hitherto squeezed for the ben-
efit of industry The Emergency Measures of August
1972 was a rescue package targeted at businesses
(many of them small- and medium- sized) heavily
indebted to the underground financial market.
Anti-corruption campaigns that coincided with the
leadership changes of 1961 and 1980, while serving
as a convenient means of purging political oppo-
nents, also elicited public approval.
3 The Hidden Costs and their
Political Ramifications
From the foregoing discussion, corruption was
arguably 'functional' to Korean development during
the authoritarian period in the sense that it
cemented the government-business relationship.
The government picked the winners and rewarded
them for taking risks, while the winners ploughed
some of their profits back into the political mainte-
nance of the government and at the same time the
economy grew Inevitably, there was also a down
side to this virtuous circle. The close government-
business nexus (chongkyong yuchak or literally,
'political economic adhesion') also gave rise to a
number of intractable social problems, many of
which remain politically contentious to this day
If corruption helped to consolidate the relationship
between government and big business, the twin
pillars of economic growth, it also imposed painful
costs on those sections of society outside this
charmed circle. Public disasters (sinking ferries,
falling bridges, exploding gas pipelines, collapsing
department stores) tell us a great deal about the
contradictions of Korea development and the role
One example was the scandal involving dealings in the The effectiveness of the targeting mechanism is
underground financial market implicating President forcefully illustrated in Amsden work.
Chun in-laws.
of corruption within it. All the accidents pointed to
the contractors' desire to cut corners, (whether by
shoddy workmanship, using inferior material or
neglecting safety) being tolerated by public officials
for the sake of speeding up development. By con-
trast, Korean products overseas (be they buildings
or manufactures) are competitively priced, increas-
ingly sophisticated and obviously subject to strict
quality control. This paradox illustrated the sacri-
fice of domestic popular interests in the promotion
of export share: in exchange for export growth the
government compensated producers by allowing
monopolization of the domestic market (the sale of
inferior products at inflated prices being one of its
symptoms), guaranteed contracts on public projects
(with some of the profits finding their way back to
official party funds in the process) and the circum-
vention of already minimal regulations in areas such
as public safety and labour rights.
Complementary to domestic monopolization was
the provision of subsidized credit to proven
exporters and those producers charged with devel-
oping the sectors designated strategic (usually the
same business groups or chaebol). While being an
effective instrument of industrial development, it
also engendered opportunities for the misuse of
public funds. So long as businesses fulfilled the
aforementioned objectives, the government would
turn a blind eye to their diversion of subsidies to
non-productive purposes such as speculation in
Seoul real estate (the demand for commercial and
residential property there being insatiable) and the
relending of funds on the underground financial
market (itself a consequence of credit rationing).
Apart from the opportunities and incentives for cor-
ruption arising from their servicing of business
needs, senior government officials could also
directly appropriate public funds for personal gain
as was illustrated in the conviction in 1988 of for-
mer President Chun brother for embezzlement
from the Saemaul (New Village) Foundation.8
If the growth process enabled big business and gov-
ernment to derive major institutional and individ-
ual financial benefits, it must be remembered that
8 The corruption of 'Baby Chun' and Chun's wife are
discussed in M. Clifford, Troubled Tiger. Business-
men, Bureaucrats and Generals in South Korea
(Armonk: ME. Sharpe, 1994). Clifford is impressed by
the early promise of Kim Young-sSaml reforms.
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such gains also occurred against a background of
growing popular welfare. The reduction of absolute
poverty and rising real wages throughout the 1970s
and 1980s suggests that the Korean growth model
was far from exclusionary But the mutual payoffs
arising from the government-business relationship
became increasingly sensitive politically and a focus
of social discontent. How can we explain the emer-
gence of corruption as a political issue during the
1980s?
The democratization of 1987 has often been
explained in terms of authoritarianism becoming a
victim of its own success. By satisfying basic needs
and nurturing those sections of society (notably the
middle class) that expected wider political partic-
ipation, the authoritarian development model
sowed the seeds of its own destruction.°
Democratization would probably not have occurred
so quickly had there been no middle class support
for the student protests in the summer of 1987. In
spite of their relatively privileged position com-
pared to manual workers, Korea's middle classes
harboured grievances against authoritarian rule, a
number of which sprang from the abuses involved
in the government-business nexus. Priority loans to
big business made it difficult for small businessmen
to borrow for expansion. Instead they had to bor-
row at exorbitant rates from the underground finan-
cial market, a sctor in which the politically and
economically powerful also dabbled. While real
estate holdings might have compensated the chaebol
for exporting at very tight profit margins, the spi-
ralling of property prices put home ownership
beyond the reach of not only the poor but most of
the middle classes as well. Apart from the stifling
effect of authoritarianism upon many professionals
(especially in areas such as education and the
media), the underside of the export platform
touched the core of the middle classes' material
existence.
The existence of conservative democratic alterna-
tives (represented by Kim Young-sam and Kim
Dae-jung) was another important factor facilitating
the shifting of middle class opinion away from
For example, see J. Cotton, 'From authoritarianism to
democracy in South Korea', Political Studies 37 (1989).
authoritarian rule. Notwithstanding the radical
student factions (who also supported constitutional
reform, albeit as a tactical measure), broad public
opinion was for reform and not social revolution.
The alternative to authoritarianism proffered by the
Kims (a package that the erstwhile authoritarians
themselves soon adopted) was an appealing one:
individual freedom and the rooting out of the afore-
mentioned abuses of power without sacrificing eco-
nomic dynamism. Yet almost ten years has now
elapsed since democratization and thoroughgoing
reform has proven elusive, the issue to which we
now turn.
4 Democratization and Economic
Liberalization
Given that corruption is associated with the exis-
tence of a cosy relationship between public officials
and their favoured producers, in theory, we should
expect democratization and economic liberalization
to erode the conditions on which corruption
thrives. By opening up the political process,
democratization subjects officials to the pressure of
public scrutiny lt also facilitates the establishment
of countervailing powers to the government and its
clients. Economic liberalization leads to the separa-
tion of government and business. The motivation
for collusion, the exchange of financial favours for
domestic monopoly, disappears with the competi-
tion that liberalization brings. Such optimistic
expectations, however, have not yet been borne out
by the Korean experience of economic and political
reform. After almost a decade since the fall of
authoritarianism and despite repeated pronounce-
ments about liberalization, corruption appears to
remain deeply rooted in both the private and pub-
lic sectors. How should we account for this pattern
of behaviour and what are its implications?
Kim Young-sam promised clean government at the
start of his presidency He categorically stated that
he would refuse any money offered to him by busi-
ness. The anti-corruption emphasis appeared to
For example, in October 1995, an opposition
legislator, Un-tae Park, was arrested for taking bribes
and influence peddling. In September that year, the
opposition was offering to drop allegations about DLP
legislators in exchange for the government dropping of
charges against opposition legislators.
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have some substance when a number of senior
military men and functionaries of the ruling DLP
(Democratic Liberal Party) were dismissed from
office in 1993. More significantly, after almost ten
years of deliberation, a real names reform outlawing
the holding of bank accounts under false names (a
practice synonymous with corruption and tax eva-
sion) was enacted in August 1993 and electoral
laws placed strict limits on candidates' expendi-
tures. While public disasters may be seen as lega-
cies of the authoritarian past or even as the failure
of enforcement at the local level, the persistent alle-
gations of financial impropriety surrounding legis-
lators of all parties cannot be so easily explained
away'° On top of that, there is a lack of willingness
to enforce regulations rigorously." For example, the
rumour concerning the Roh political fund had been
circulating for some time before formal action was
taken'2 whilst in July 1994, the public prosecutor
decided that former presidents Chun and Roh
could not be punished for the misdemeanours com-
mitted during their rule although the government is
under renewed pressure to recommence proceed-
ings especially in the light of the corruption revela-
tions. All this suggests that the foundations of
money politics remain entrenched.
It can be argued that corruption persists because
democratization and liberalization are in their
infancy and that it will take a long period of reform
for the decades of established malpractices to be
reversed. Clearly political and economic reform
still has some way to go before Korea measures up
to the standards of a mature liberal-democracy
Democratization has not been consolidated and
many aspects of authoritarian practice remain. In
October 1994, the government reaffirmed that the
National Security Law, which proscribes 'pro-North
Korean activities', would be maintained. There are
political prisoners from the 1950s who are only
now being released from detention. More signifi-
cant is the tougher line taken against the trades
unions by the government after President Kim met
with the leaders of big business. Independent labour
"The efficacy of the real names reform can be measured
by whether citizens end up paying more tax. This has
not apparently happened yet.
"In 1990, Roh's daughter received a one-year suspended
sentence for violating US currency regulations by trying
to enter the country with $US 250,000 in cash.
activists have gone underground for fear of arrest
and it is still impossible to form a union without
official permission. Effective organized countervail-
ing powers to the government-business nexus
remain absent from Korean society 1f Korea is a
democracy in the strict procedural sense, it does not
yet have the substance of a pluralistic society
The intention of liberalizing the economy had been
announced as far back as 1981. The policy of lib-
eralization was based on the perceived advantages
of greater openness for enhancing efficiency in
financial intermediation and industry Through the
1980s, progress was slow as both the Chun and Roh
governments pursued cautious programmes that
minimized the dangers of liberalization such as the
loss of domestic market share to foreign competi-
tors, capital flight and the foreign take-over of key
industries. The government continued to nurture
financially certain strategic sectors (notably elec-
tronics and information technology) and to restrict
foreign market access to sectors directly competitive
with domestic producers (especially in automobiles
and other consumer durables). Crucially instru-
mental to intervention was government control
over the financial sector. The privatization of the
leading commercial banks in 1982 did not diminish
government influence since the banks were them-
selves heavily leveraged and reliant on the central
bank. Tight regulations governing share dealing,
direct investment and banking helped to limit for-
eign participation in Korean finance. Noting the
sluggish pace of change under his predecessors,
Kim Young-sam pledged to accelerate liberalization
and promote the outwards movement of Korean
investment, a process which he called 'internation-
alization' (segye hwa). On balance three years into
the Kim administration, the overall picture contin-
ues to point to official caution. The much publi-
cized international listing of the prominent public
companies FOSCO (steel) and KEPCO (power) in
1994 only served to highlight the extent to which
foreign participation in the Korean financial system
is still hedged by official controls.
The foregoing discussion links the persistence of
corruption and other practices from the authoritar-
"On the positive side, the power of the security
agencies such as the army and the KCIA has been
drastically pared back since 1987. See Young-chul Paik,
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ian industrialization era with incomplete political
and economic reform. As an explanation, it is
incomplete on two counts. First, it begs the ques-
tion of why reform has not gone further. Second, it
associates corruption with the capacity of the
government to extract, whereas democratization
and liberalization (however incomplete) accentu-
ates the potential for corruption from the other side
by enhancing the capacity of big business to bribe.
As we have seen, restrictions from the authoritarian
era have survived the democratic transition and
continue to block the emergence of a more account-
able society in which corruption and other mal-
practices may be checked.'3 Despite his stated
concern at eradicating corruption, President Kim
has been reluctant to further democratization and
thus create the conditions whereby that goal may be
realized. The reluctance of President Kim's civilian
government to complete democratic reform is
indicative of the government's order of priorities,
namely, the maintenance of the conditions of con-
servative domination above all else. After all, the
ruling DLP was formed from a merger of the gov-
erning party and two opposition parties in 1990
with the intention of establishing a hegemonic con-
servative party like the LDP (Liberal Democratic
party) of Japan. As for the personnel turnover wit-
nessed at the beginning of the Kim administration,
they could be seen merely as leadership purges.
Previous presidents (Park in 1961 and Chun in
1980) engaged in similar manoeuvring under the
guise of fighting corruption, a view reinforced by
the fact that members of President Kim's inner cir-
cle remained unscathed in spite of their alleged
financial irregularities.
But explanation for the survival of the institutional
foundations of corruption goes beyond elite inten-
tions and requires discussion of the climate of pub-
lic opinion upon which such machinations thrive.
The first consideration is middle class opinion It
was middle class dissatisfaction with Chun that
lent critical support to the democratization move-
ment in 1987. With its concern for continuing
prosperity and worries about labour activism, a
condition of that support was the existence of
'Political reform and democratic consolidation in Korea',
Korea and World Affairs Vol 28 No 4 (Winter 1994).
credible moderate alternatives to authoritarianism.
Not surprisingly, such a body of conservative
democratic opinion has since gravitated to the DLP.
Second, superimposed above all else is the regional
dimension of Korean politics. Authoritarian indus-
trialization greatly exacerbated the historical divi-
sion between the Kyongsang (southeast) and Cholla
(southwest) regions as successive presidents from
the former (Park, Chun, Roh) skewed economic
development in favour of their home region.
Regional conflict persists and is kept alive as
President Kim Young-sam is from Kyongsang while
his principal opposition rival, Kim Dae-jung is from
Cholla. Both leaders (together with Kim Jong-pil in
his much smaller home province of Chungchong)
have fanned regional sentiment for the sake of polit-
ical advantage. Thirdly, the cold war with North
Korea legitimized the doctrine of the security state
whose legacy persists in spite of the gradual
improvement of inter-Korean relations. These three
factors underpin the conservative climate of public
opinion and thwart further political democratiza-
tion.
On the other hand, the partial democratization
since 1987 has altered the nature of government-
business relations. Whereas government domi-
nance enabled it to extract finance from the
business sector (for example, in donations to the
ruling party), democratization has enhanced the
independence of the latter but has not meant the
diminution of corruption. This has led to a restruc-
turing of the government-business nexus but has
not affected the malpractices associated with that
relationship. Business independence of the govern-
ment is demonstrated by its disclosures of past
donations to the ruling party and by its demands
for accelerated liberalization, especially of the finan-
cial sector.14 Indeed, one conglomerate leader went
as far as to challenge the DLP by launching his own
political party For their part, governments under
both Roh and Kim stressed the importance of erad-
icating unproductive incomes and other manifesta-
tions of the underground economy Yet despite
these outward signs of conflict, one can also iden-
tify elements of close affinity between the two
4Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift. State and Finance
in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia
University Press: 1991) chronicles the rise of business
discontent with excessive intervention.
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sides: government support for emerging industries;
continued import restrictions; labour controls; and
the business role in political funding, to give just a
few examples. Moreover, rhetoric often disguises
the lack of real change. For example, little headway
has been made on the problem of real estate specu-
lation amidst the serious housing shortage. Thus,
the government-business nexus persists but in a
modified form: business remains heavily reliant on
government support, but democratization has
widened its channels of influence over the govern-
ment (with the formation of breakaway conserva-
tive parties being an extreme option) and enabled it
to press its policy agenda, notably for accelerated
liberalization (in order to establish the big bus-
iness domination of the financial sector that the
government seeks to avoid), more vigorously.15
Democratization has thus increased the channels
by which business can use finance to affect the
political process.
5 Reflections on the Korean
Pattern: Change and Resilience
The wave of disasters and other scandals during the
course of 1994-5 has once again ignited public
anger over corruption and spotlighted the under-
side of the economic miracle, a world in which offi-
cials sacrifice the interests of ordinary citizens for
the sake of achieving faster growth and personal
gain. The institutional features and the seamier
aspects of the Korean political economy bear many
resemblances to those of Japan and the parallels
caution against any temptation to predict far-reach-
ing change in Korea.
That similarities between the Korean and Japanese
political economies abound is not surprising given
the latter's status as the former colonial power and
the conscious Korean attempts at emulation since
the early 1960s. The similar economic models of
both countrïes (Japan also exercised great caition
over the issue of liberalization) are sustained by a
political process in which votes are secured by the
dispensation of largesse, the ultimate provider of
which is big business. The Japanese experience
' That the partial liberalization of finance greatly
strengthened the chaebol is discussed in A. Amsden and
Yoon-dae Euh, 'Republic of Korea's financial reform:
what are the lessons?',UNCTAD Discussion Paper 30
(UNCTAD: Geneva, April 1990).
poïnts to the successful maintenance of conservative
rule in the face of public discontent over the results
of government-business collusion. Electorally, the
LDP survived the furore caused by the appalling
environmental degradation of the 1960s (symbol-
ized by the poisoning of a fishing village called
Minimata) as well as the bribery scandals of the
1970s and 1980s that removed three prime minis-
ters. Notwithstanding the continuing over-repre-
sentation of the pro-LDP areas and the party's vastly
superior financial clout, 40 years of uninterrupted
rule could not have been maintained without
accommodating the all important public aspiration
for growth. Similar conditions also buttress conser-
vative rule in Korea where it is also grounded on a
strong regional appeal to the most populous
province. The Korean combination of authoritarian
legacy and tense security situation makes the polit-
ical spectrum much narrower: from the authoritar-
ian remnants on the right of the DLP to Kim
Dae-jung's cautious populism.
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The effect of democratization and liberalization in
Korea has been to strengthen one side of the gov-
ernment-business relationship (namely business)
rather than to undermine the dominance of that
nexus per se. Against this background, it is not
surprising that corruption continues to thrive. The
evidence from countries where liberalization is
advanced is that it is more a formula for promoting
efficiency in a very narrow sense than a check
against corruption. By contrast, fighting corrup-
tion demands effective regulation, the necessary
con-ditions of which are the existence of genuine
countervailing institutional and societal powers.
However, the very success of the Korean (and
arguably, East Asian) capitalist strategy in fostering
growth with mild redistributive measures is con-
ducive to the pattern of arrested democratization
discussed here.
